has a strong symbolic effect, its impact may be short-lived: the VHA has a long history of surviving scandals. Criticized for poor quality of care in the 1980s, the agency admirably improved processes and care management. Yet problems of capacity and access to care represent a more fundamental, structural challenge.
Some recent commentators have suggested that the current scandal offers yet another opportunity to reform the VHA system. But the conclusion that adequate reform would entail making minor modifications to the VHA services that are currently provided is uninspiring. Perhaps now is the time for more sweeping reform of the VHA -reform designed with an eye toward recent trends, future projections, and a desire to improve veterans' access to high-quality health care.
The VHA finds itself in an unenviable position: it incurs the high fixed costs of a brick-andmortar health care system, the largest salaried workforce in the federal government, and a large administration. To increase efficient use of these fixed-cost assets by spreading their costs across a larger base, the VHA has sought to increase enrollment among veterans. This effort has been successful and generated increased demand -about two thirds of enrollees actually use VHA services -which has led to calls for expanding and building more facilities. But the effort also resulted in the provision of services to more nonveterans, as well as in fast-growing medical appropriations that outstrip enrollment trends (see table) .
The recent enrollment gains, however, are unlikely to continue, for three reasons. First, the veteran population is rapidly decreasing and is projected to drop by one third in the next 25 years (www .va.gov/vetdata/Veteran_Population .asp). Second, the vast majority of veterans already have access to health care: nearly 90% of veterans younger than 65 years of age have health insurance, 1 3 Although centralization of some services might make sense, it seems that such "national" centers are quite inconvenient for most potential patients and therefore provide specialty services primarily to nearby residents. 4 Recent legislation proposes a two-part effort to improve access to care for veterans, by expanding the VHA workforce and access points and by encouraging the use of private-sector care for veterans who live at a distance from VHA facilities. The first part -adding more physicians or hospitals in an attempt to reduce VHA wait lists -will be very expensive and will not resolve these fundamental issues. The bigger and more important question is whether the United States really needs a separate, increasingly expensive, brick-andmortar health care system for a relatively small and rapidly shrinking population. The second effort can be used to answer a more foundational question: Might vet- erans and taxpayers be better served if true reform -designed to prepare the VHA for a thriving future while better serving veterans -were undertaken? Such a reform might begin on three fronts. First, the VHA could transition out of the health care delivery business. Initial efforts could focus on high-cost inpatient care, for which economies of scale can be achieved and there is ample, high-quality capacity in the private sector at Medicare rates. 3 In the short run, the VHA might continue providing the type of care that its service population wants from itfor instance, primary care 1 -or care in which it has special expertise, such as mental health or rehabilitation services. Perhaps, in order to increase its denominator and generate a new revenue stream while shedding expensive hospital assets, the VHA could consider providing outpatient services in these areas of medicine to nonveterans, paid for by other insurance providers.
Second, the VHA could leverage the competencies of the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) and support utilization of privatesector health care by subsidizing premiums, deductibles, and copayments for enrolled veterans. Such a move would reduce costs to taxpayers ($6,000 a year would buy a lot of copayments and deductibles in Medicare, Obamacare, and private insurance), reduce veterans' out-of-pocket costs, and massively expand access to care for veterans without concurrently increasing fixed-cost obligations. Such efforts might also reduce duplication of payment for services within the federal government, potentially saving taxpayers billions of dollars. 5 Finally, the VHA could take on the task of care coordination for its service population. Using its strong research enterprise in health services, the VHA could work with the VBA to identify the best local health care systems and ensure that the VHA's service population is directed to the highest-quality local care providers. Using benefits-design methods suggested by behavioral economics to encourage veterans to use these non-VHA providers would preserve veterans' choice, reduce health care expenditures, and most important, save veterans' lives by shifting them to hospitals with lower mortality rates. 3 Clearly, there are obstacles to implementing such a plan. First, laws would need to be passed to allow for payment of deductibles, copayments, or premiums, particularly for other federal programs such as Medicare. Nonetheless, financial and care coordination across federal institutions might make sense to taxpayers. Second, VHA personnel might not be enamored of the proposal. Jobs and turf would be redirected to the private sector, which might raise concerns among policymakers who worry about the softness of the current economic recovery. Finally, it is not clear how veterans might respond if their benefits packages and access were changed in these ways; they would have to decide whether it was worth it to trade a visible, dedicated, brick-and-mortar system for enhanced access to the private system used by most of the population, and they would have to determine whether they trusted politicians to maintain access to that system. Undoubtedly, a pilot test of these reforms would be warranted before widespread implementation.
The VHA's current crisis provides an opportunity to dramatically rethink the role that the agency plays in improving access to high-quality, high-value care for its service population. To simply go on doing more of the same is to fail to recognize the challenge that the VHA's cost and population structure pose in the longer run. Just as they plan for new roles for the federal government as part of an exit strategy from a war that is winding down, politicians with longerterm views might envision a new way for the VHA to work with other federal departments and the private sector to reduce its overall and per capita costs, shed costly and unproductive assets, save taxpayers money, reduce veterans' health care expenditures, and improve veterans' outcomes.
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